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Abstract
There are many situations in which a principal delegates decisions
to a better-informed agent but does not choose to give full discretion.
This paper discusses one reason why this might be desirable: the agent
may have tastes that di¤er from those of the principal. Limiting the
agents discretion has the advantage that an untrustworthy agent is
constrained from following policies that are disliked by the principal,
but the disadvantage that trustworthy agents are then not permit-
ted to carry out some desirable policies. It is shown that a greater
risk of the agent being untrustworthy will lead to her being o¤ered
less discretion over policy. Applications of the model involve judicial
sentencing policy, monetary policy, and pricing policy in a regulated
industry.
Keywords: Principal-Agent Problem; Delegation; Discretion; Manda-
tory Sentences; Monetary Policy; Regulation.
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1 Introduction
There are many situations in which a principal delegates decisions to a better-
informed agent, but does not choose to give the agent full discretion.1 Exam-
ples discussed in this paper include the imposition of mandatory sentences
on the judiciary, the limits placed on central bankers concerning monetary or
exchange rate policy, and the limits placed on industry regulators concerning
pricing policy. This paper proposes a framework in which to analyse these
and similar situations.
There are a variety of reasons why it may be desirable to limit agency
discretion, and they usually involve the possibility that the agent may not
always be trusted to implement the principals ideal policy. This presents an
obvious danger for delegation, and the principal must trade o¤ the benets
of o¤ering wide agency discretion  the ability of trustworthy agents to be
able to respond freely to changing circumstances  against the drawbacks
 the ability of an untrustworthy agent to pursue undesirable policies.
A trivial example may help to x ideas. Suppose a government is con-
sidering policy towards the speed of vehicles on roads. The ideal maximum
speed of a given driver on a given road is a function of, inter alia, the tra¢ c
conditions on the road, the weather, the type of road, the type of car, and
the skill of the driver. While it is commonplace to link the speed limit to
the type of road, it is impractical to link the permitted speed to any other
of the above variables. On the other hand, a given driver can condition her
speed on each of these factors, but she may have di¤erent views on the desir-
able speed given these factors compared to the government. The government
then faces an obvious tradeo¤: granting drivers full discretion allows for the
full use of private information in determining speed, but also allows drivers
with di¤erent preferences (e.g. reckless drivers) to drive at speeds which
the government feels inappropriate given the conditions. However, although
imposing a speed limit does mitigate the danger of, say, reckless driving, it
also prevents perfectly safe drivers from driving fast should conditions be
appropriate. Presumably, the greater the proportion of drivers whose pref-
erences over travel time and safety coincide with the governments, the more
discretion drivers as a whole should be given  see Proposition 1 below.
1An early version of this paper was presented at a joint CEPR/ECARE workshop on
The Political Economy of Competition Policyin Brussels, November 1993. I am grateful
to John Dri¢ ll, Bruno Jullien, Paul Klemperer, Tracy Lewis, Preston McAfee, Ray Rees,
Patrick Rey, David Salant and Paul Seabright for helpful comments.
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In general, there are at least three reasons why an agent might not pursue
correct policies should they be given discretion:
1. The rst is the problem of dynamic consistency which has been much
analysed in a variety of contexts.2 In the regulation setting a regulator may
be tempted to set low prices  prices that cover only the rms future average
avoidable costs  once sunk-cost investments on the part of the rm have
been made. One way to overcome this danger of ex post opportunism might
be for government to limit the regulators discretion by imposing the rule
that the rm always be granted a fair return on used and usefulcapital.3
2. Then there is the possibility of the agent being inuenced by vari-
ous interest group pressures. This political economyor capturetheory of
decision-making was developed by Stigler (1971), Posner (1974) and Peltz-
man (1976), and these papers argue that limits to agency discretion are
desirable, both in order to prevent bad policies being followed by captured
agents, and to remove the incentive for interest groups to engage in wasteful
rent-seeking behavior.
3. As discussed in the speed limit example above, a third reason is that
the agent may have xed but divergent preferences over policy from those
of the principal.4 This could be seen as the opposite polar case to that
of capture. Instead of modelling the problem as one in which all potential
agents have identical and known utility functions but who may be tempted
to alter their actions by inducements from interested parties, here agents
tastes are exogenous but unknown. Take the case of regulation. Conditions
within the industry concerned are uncertain  for instance, the cost level
or the potential for cost reduction are things that are not known ex ante 
and the regulator presumably is better informed about these conditions than
government. (That is one reason why governments employ specialist regu-
lators.) For this reason the government will delegate decisions about, say,
the tightness of price control to the regulator. This system works perfectly
well provided government and regulator agree on the correct policy given cir-
cumstances within the industry; that is to say, if their preferences coincide.
However, it is not always reasonable to assume that this is so, and the regu-
2See, among many others, Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Gilbert and Newbery
(1994).
3For a discussion of this point, see Greenwald (1984).
4Vickers (1985) examines a model where a principal deliberately hires an agent with
divergent tastes in order to be able credibly to commit to desirable policies. For instance,
in a Cournot oligopoly setting, if a rms owners (who are interested in prot) hire a
manager who is also interested in the rms output (and whose preferences are publically
known), then in equilibrium the rms prots could increase. For a similar idea in the
monetary policy area, see Rogo¤ (1985).
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lator may tend to favour consumer or industry interests to a greater extent
than the government would wish and for this reason it may be desirable to
limit regulatory discretion. This reason for limiting discretion has received
less attention than the others, and it is the purpose of this paper to discuss
some of the issues involved.
One recent paper which does not t into any of these categories is the
study of the allocation of decision-making within organizations by Athey et
al. (1994). In their model there is a continuum of possible types of decision
which might need to be made, indexed by a random variable s 2 [0; 1],
and there are two people who can take any decision, a senior or a junior
agent. (One application is to doctors and nurses, where the question is which
profession should treat which illnesses.) The authors assume that the senior
agent has a comparative advantage in making the decisions labelled with high
s (the important decisions). As a result, the junior person makes all decisions
in a range [0; s] and the senior person makes the remaining decisions. The
primary purpose of the paper is to analyze what determines s, the degree of
discretion of the junior agent. There are no information asymmetries in the
model, and the senior person is well-informed about both the state s and the
ability of the junior person. The reason that the allocation of decision-making
is not simply made on the basis of which agent has the absolute advantage
in making the particular decision is because it is assumed that there are
decreasing returns to decision making, and the more decisions the senior
agent has to make the lower the quality of her decisions. Because of this, at
the marginal decision (the highest state in which the junior agent makes the
decision, denoted s above) it may be that the senior agent has the absolute
advantage. (The authors interpret this as a kind of hands-o¤management
style.) They also show that as the likelihood of more the important decisions
increases, the junior agent should be given more discretion over policy (in
the sense that s increases), although the e¤ect on the frequency of junior
decision-making is ambiguous.
The most closely related paper to this one, however, is Holmstrom (1984).
From section 3 onwards in his paper he discusses a model which is very similar
to that discussed here in sections 2 and 3. In particular, he has a model
where a principal delegates a decision to a better-informed agent who may
have di¤erent preferences over policy. As in the present paper, the principal
controls the agent by restricting the discretion over policy granted to the
agent, rather than by using monetary incentives for instance. In section 5
he assumes that discretion is restricted by o¤ering the agent an interval of
choices from which she is free to choose. In addition he has a result (Theorem
3 in his paper) that is similar to the main result of this paper, namely,
that an agent with preferences close to the principals will be given more
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discretion than one with more divergent preferences. The main di¤erence
between the two papers is that the agent in Holmstroms framework has
known preferences, whereas in this paper the principal is uncertain about the
agents preferences. Another di¤erence is that I use elementary mathematics
throughout, and try to emphasize the various applications of this sort of
model.5
The plan of this paper is as follows. A simple model is presented in sec-
tion 2 in which the principal is uncertain of the decision the agent would like
to make. There it is shown that the more reliable the agent is, the more
discretion over policy she should be given. The modelling of the reliability
of the agent is given one possible foundation in section 3, where the agent
is assumed to have divergent tastes from the principal. Applications of this
theory are discussed in section 4, and these are to sentencing policy, regula-
tory pricing policy, and to monetary policy. Finally, conclusions and possible
directions for further work are discussed in section 5.
2 A Model
A Principal is planning to delegate the making of a decision to an Agent
(or a population of agents). The Principal gains utility u(d; ) if decision
d is made when  is the state of the world. Both d and  are assumed
to be scalars.6 The Principal aims to maximize the expected value of this
utility function. The decision variable d is constrained to lie in the real
interval [dmin; dmax]. Utility u(; ) is concave in d and the marginal utility
of increasing d, ud(d; ), is increasing in . The Principal is assumed to be
unable to observe  (otherwise she could simply maximize her utility given
 and obtain the rst best), but believes  to be distributed with support
[min; max] and density function f(). Let d() be the rst-best choice for
5Another related paper is De Bijl (1995) where an agent has to choose between a nite
number of projects over which she has unknown preferences from the point of view of the
principal. The agent can increase the principals payo¤ by expending e¤ort, the cost of
which is negatively related to the agents private benets of the project (which is private
information). As in this paper and Homstroms paper, De Bijl assumes that the principal
does not attempt to inuence the agents decision using monetary incentives, but rather
by simply restricting her options.
6Although it is crucial in all the following analysis that the decision variable d be
a scalar, it is relatively straightforward to allow  to be multi-dimensional. Indeed, in
Armstrong (1994) and Holmstrom (1984)  is allowed to be a vector. However, it does
simplify the analysis somewhat  notably in Lemma 1 below  and so in this paper  is
a scalar.
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the Principal given , i.e.
d() maximizesdmin  d  dmax u(d; ) :
Because ud is increasing in , it follows that d() is increasing in . Finally,
let d denote the Principals best choice in the absence of delegation, i.e.
d maximizesdmin  d  dmaxU(d)
where U(d) = Eu(d; ) is the Principals expected welfare if the policy d
is followed in all states of the world , and E[] takes expectations over
. (Holmstrom (1984) calls d the optimal centralized decision.) Since u is
concave in d, if follows that U is also concave in d.
The Agent, unlike the Principal, is assumed to observe . The Agent,
if unconstrained, is assumed to follow a policy given  which the Principal
believes to be stochastic. In particular, if the state of the world is , the
probability that the unconstrained Agent chooses a policy   d is given by
the distribution function G(d; ). This function summarises all the relevant
information about the Agent. For now, we will analyze the Principals opti-
mal policy using this reduced-formbehaviour function for the Agent; later
in section 3 we will derive the function G using more primitive assumptions
about the Agents preferences. For simplicity, suppose that G is a smooth
function, and write g(d; ) = Gd(d; ) to be the density function for d given .
Assume that G(dmin; ) = 0 and G(dmax; ) = 1 for all . Most importantly,
I assume that, like the Principal, the Agent is more likely to choose a higher
value of d if  is higher; in other words
G(d; ) is decreasing in . (1)
This assumption  that the Principal and Agent agree about which values
of the parameter  should lead to higher values of d being chosen  plays the
role of Holmstroms assumption that preferences are coherent (Holmstrom,
1984, p.127). Without this assumption it is likely that delegation will have
no benets and the Principal will be able to do no better than to follow
policy d in all states of the world  see footnote 9 below.
Because of the danger of the Agents ideal choice diverging from that of
the Principal, the latter wishes to inuence the decision of the former. In
theory, one method of doing this is for the Principal to make the income of
the Agent depend in some way on her decision. For instance, if the Agent
is likely to choose a lower value of d than the Principal would wish  so
that G(d(); ) is rather large  then the Principal may well wish to make
the pay of the Agent depend positively on the value of d chosen in order to
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counteract this tendency. However, I make the strong assumption that the
Principal chooses not to use the instrument of decision-contingent payments
(or is constrained not to do so). Instead, she inuences the Agents behav-
ior only by means of restricting the set of decisions the Agent may choose.
Thus, rather than being permitted to choose d from the whole set of possible
decisions, [dmin; dmax], the Agent is constrained to choose from some strict
subset of decisions, say D  [dmin; dmax].
There are several reasons why I make this assumption. First, in practice
it is often the case that when delegating decisions to agents, principals do not
make choice-contingent payments. This is certainly true for the applications
discussed below in section 4. In this sense, the analysis of the paper is rather
descriptive and addresses the sub-problem of how much discretion to give
the agent given that there is no incentive scheme in place (or more generally,
given a xed incentive scheme), rather than aimed at the more fundamental
question of why such incentive schemes are not observed in practice in many
cases.
A second possible justication for assuming away decision-related pay-
ments could be the one discussed in Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991). They
analyze a setting in which an agent has several tasks to perform, each of
which competes for her time, and her performance in some of these tasks is
not observable to the principal. Therefore, by making her income depend pos-
itively on those dimensions of performance that are observable, there is the
danger that the agent will concentrate her time on the more lucrative tasks
to the detriment of the others, which, although unobserved, are benecial for
the principal. As a result, it may be optimal not to use performance-related
incentive payments in a multitask setting. Although their model involves
moral hazard rather than adverse selection, similar arguments could be made
within the framework of this paper. Looking ahead to section 4.1 below, for
instance, if it were generally felt that judges were on average too lenient in
their sentencing policy for a particular crime then one option might be to
reward judges on the basis of their sentencing record. However, together with
other drawbacks, such a scheme could distort a judges incentives over other,
unobserved decision variables (such as whether to rule on debatable points
of law in favour of, or against, the defendant).7 ;8
7Another example of multitask distortions in the legal context is the following: a pro-
posal in Britain which surfaces from time to time is to make the likelihood of a judge being
promoted to a more senior position depend negatively upon the number of their cases in
which they nd against the defendant and which are over-turned on appeal (and without
any new evidence being produced). If such cases are penalized severely, this scheme could
give an incentive for judges to nd for the defendant more often than otherwise.
8Another possible theoretical justication for not using decision-contingent payment
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A third way to justify the exclusion of decision-contingent payment schemes
is simply to assume that the agent is innitely risk-averseand so cares only
about her minimum possible payment. In such a case there is nothing to be
gained by the principal in o¤ering monetary incentive schemes. This mod-
elling approach is used in Aghion and Tirole (1994), for instance.
Finally, the analysis required to determine the optimal payment schedule
would in general be rather demanding. For instance, in section 3 below,
the model involves two dimensions of informational asymmetry (the taste
parameter  and the state of the world ), and this implies we would have
to enter the di¢ cult area of multidimensional mechanism design.
Suppose, then, that the Principal inuences the behavior of the Agent by
means only of limiting her discretion to some subset D of all possible choices.
I make the further simplifying assumption that the Principal considers only
sets D that are intervals:
Assumption: The Principal considers only discretion sets of the form
D = [d1; d2]  [dmin; dmax] : (2)
I do this partly because it seems a natural way to represent the degree of
discretiongiven to the Agent and, again, partly because the general case of
allowing any (compact) setD  [dmin; dmax] is technically di¢ cult.9 Thus the
Agent is free to make her choice of policy provided her choice d lies between
the lower bound d1 and the upper bound d2. The Agent is given no discretion
if d1 = d2 (in which case it is optimal for the Principal to set d1 = d2 = d).
The functionG(d; ) describes the Agents behaviour given no constraints.
We have to make an assumption about her behaviour given bounds on her
discretion, and I make the simplest assumption, namely, if d is the Agents
optimal choice (given some state of the world ) and this lies outside the
permitted range, then she will choose the point in the permitted range which
is closest to her ideal choice, i.e. if d < d1 then she will choose d1 and if
d > d2 she will choose d2. (Implicit in this is an assumption that the Agents
preferences are single-peaked in d for each .)
Given this assumption it is straightforward to calculate the Principals
expected utility given the bounds d1 and d2. First of all, x the state of the
schemes is given by La¤ont and Tirole (1993, chapter 11), who show it is possible that
choice-contingent payments to the agent are undesirable ex ante. That is to say, the abilty
of the principal to make such payments to the agent could leave the principal vulnerable
to capture by interested parties (including the agent), and in some case it is optimal to
constrain the principal from using such incentive payments.
9Holmstrom (1984, Appendix A) proves under fairly general conditions that there exists
an optimal compact set of options for the Principal, but he has no results concerning when
this optimal set is an interval. As in this paper, Holmstrom (1984, section 4 onwards)
makes the ad hoc assumption that the control sets are intervals.
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world . Then the Principals expected utility given  and the bounds d1 and
d2, denoted w(d1; d2; ), is given by
w(d1; d2; ) = G(d1; )u(d1; ) + [1 G(d2; )]u(d2; ) +
Z d2
d1
u(; )g(; ) d :
(3)
(The rst term gives the Principals utility when the lower bound d1 is binding
for the Agent, which occurs with probabilityG(d1; ), the second is her utility
when the upper bound binds, while the third is her expected utility when
the Agent is not constrained by the bounds.) This can be more conveniently
be written in the separable form
w(d1; d2; ) = 1(d1; ) + 2(d2; )  0() (4)
where
0() =
Z dmax
dmin
u(; )g(; ) d
1(d; ) = G(d; )u(d; ) +
Z dmax
d
u(; )g(; ) d (5)
2(d; ) = [1 G(d; )]u(d; ) +
Z d
dmin
u(; )g(; ) d :
In words, the function 0 gives the Principals expected welfare given  if
the Agent is given full discretion over policy, 1 is expected welfare if she
sets only a lower bound on the Agents discretion given by d, while 2 gives
her expected welfare if she sets only an upper bound given by d. Finally, the
Principals expected welfare over all states of the world , denotedW (d1; d2),
is just the expectation of w:
W (d1; d2) = 1(d1) + 2(d2)  0 (6)
where 0 = E0() is the Principals expected utility over all states of the
world obtained by granting the Agent full discretion over policy, 1(d) =
E1(d; ) is her expected utility from setting only a lower bound of d, and
2(d) = E2(d; ) is her expected utility from setting only an upper bound
of d. The optimal bounds on the Agents discretion, then, are given by
maximizing W with respect to d1 and d2 subject to the constraint d1 
d2. From (5), since @1(d; )=@d = G(d; )ud(d; ) and @2(d; )=@d = [1  
G(d; )]ud(d; ), we obtain
01(d) = E [G(d; )ud(d; )] (7)
02(d) = E [[1 G(d; )]ud(d; )]
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These expressions give the marginal benet of increasing the lower and upper
bounds, respectively.
At rst glance it might be thought that we would have to impose the
constraint that d1  d2 when maximizingW in (6). However, the next result
shows this not to be so.
Lemma 1
(i) 1(d) is decreasing for d > d;
(ii) 2(d) is increasing for d < d:
Proof. See Appendix.
This has the corollary that if d1 maximizes 1(d) then d1  d, and if
d2 maximizes 2(d) then d2  d. In particular, the optimal lower bound
on the Agents discretion maximizes 1(d) while the optimal upper bound
maximizes 2(d), and we need not worry about the constraint d1  d2.
Finally, since d is the optimal policy without delegation and d1  d  d2;
the optimal interval o¤ered to the Agent necessarily includes this optimal
non-delegation decision. Here, if the Principal sets d1 = d2 = d the Agent is
given no discretion, and so U(d)  1(d)+2(d) 0. This is maximized at
d = d. The two functions i() are maximized at d = di which necessarily
bracket d. Moreover, we must have 1(dmin) = 0 since if only a lower
bound is set and set equal to the minimum possible d, then the Agent is
e¤ectively given full discretion. Similarly, 2(dmax) = 0. Finally, it follows
that 1(dmax) = U(dmax) since if a only a lower bound is set and set equal to
the maximum possible d, then the Agent is e¤ectively granted no discretion
and expected utility is just U(dmax). Similarly, 2(dmin) = U(dmin).10
The next Lemma describes the case of one-sidederrors:
Lemma 2
(i) If G(d(); ) = 0 for all , then 1(d) is decreasing for all d;
(ii) If G(d(); ) = 1 for all , then 2(d) is increasing for all d:
Proof. Obvious from proof of Lemma 1.
10It seems worth at this point to stress how important assumption (1) is if delegation
and discretion is to be of any value to the Principal. Suppose, in contrast to (1), that
G(d; ) was increasing in , so that the Agent was more likely to choose a low value of d if
 is high. In this case the proof of Lemma 1 shows that (i) 1(d) is increasing for d < d,
and (ii) 2(d) is decreasing for d > d. This implies that the maximand of 1 is greater
than d, while the maximand of 2 is lower than d, and so the constraint that d1  d2 is
always binding in this case. In other words, the Agent should be given no discretion, and
the Principal should simply follow policy d in all states of the world.
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Part (i) of this lemma states that if the Agent never wishes to choose a pol-
icy which is lower than the Principals ideal policy d(), then the Principals
welfare from setting a lower bound is always decreasing in that bound, and
therefore, this lower bound should be set as low as possible, and d1 = dmin.
This is completely intuitive: if the only danger comes from the Agent choos-
ing too high a policy, then the only tool the Principal should choose is to
impose an upper bound on the allowed decisions. Similarly, if the only danger
is from the Agent choosing too low a policy then only a lower bound should
be imposed (part (ii) above). One example of a case with one-sidederrors
might be the driving example discussed in the Introduction: if the govern-
ment felt that the principal danger was of people driving too fast for the
conditions  for instance, because they systematically ignored the negative
externality of driving fast on the safety of other drivers  then there is no
need to impose a minimum speed limit.
2.1 Comparative Statics
Suppose next that there is a change of Principal  what e¤ect should this
have on the optimal discretion interval? Suppose that the utility functions
for the two Principals are u(d; ) and u^(d; ) respectively, and that the second
has a preference for higher decisions d, all else equal, than the rst, i.e.
u^d(d; )  ud(d; ): (8)
Let 1 and ^1 be their respective welfare levels from setting a lower bound,
and let 2 and ^2 be their respective welfare levels from setting an upper
bound. Then an examination of (7) above shows that
^01(d)  01(d)
^02(d)  02(d)
and hence that the optimal lower bound is higher for the second Principal
than the rst, and similarly for the optimal upper bound. We summarise
this in the following lemma:
Lemma 3 Suppose there are two Principals with utility functions u and u^
which satisfy (8). If their optimal intervals of discretion are [d1; d2] and
[d^1; d^2] respectively, then d^1  d1 and d^2  d2:
The next result concerns the tightness of the limits to discretion rather
than the levels of the bounds. Suppose we have two Agents (or populations
of Agents) described by the stochastic response functions G(d; ) and G^(d; )
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respectively. Let us say that the rst Agent is more reliable than the second
if
d < d()) G^(d; )  G(d; ) (9)
d > d()) G^(d; )  G(d; )
for all . In words, one Agent is more reliable than another if, given , she is
more likely to make a decision which is close to the Principals ideal decision
than the other Agent.
The next result is the main result of the paper, and states that if one
Agent is more reliable than another the Principal should give that Agent
more discretion in her decision-making, and also that the Principal obtains
a higher expected utility from the more reliable Agent.
Proposition 1 Suppose there are two Agents (or two populations of Agents)
whose decisions are described by the functions G(d; ) and G^(d; ) respec-
tively. Let the Principals optimal intervals for the two Agents be [d1; d2] and
[d^1; d^2] respectively. Suppose that the rst Agent is more reliable than the sec-
ond in the sense of (9). Then the Principals expected utility from delegating
to the rst Agent is higher than with the second, and
[d^1; d^2]  [d1; d2] :
Proof. See Appendix.
Loosely speaking, this result states that increasing the risk of the Agent
deviating from the Principals preferred decision causes the Principals utility
to fall and causes the Agent to be given less discretion.11
A second attractive hypothesis is that increasing the variability of , in
some sense, should cause the Agent to be given greater discretion in order to
respond to a more variable environment. For instance, if the distribution of
 was very tightly focused around , say, then it is optimal for the Principal
to o¤er very little discretion, and to set very tight bounds around the point
d() so as to attain approximately the rst best. However, it appears to be
di¢ cult to obtain any straightforward comparative statics results on changing
the distribution of  without making strong assumptions about the functional
forms of G(d; ) and u(d; ). For instance, from (7) it is clear that if we
could assume that the function G(d; )ud(d; ) was concave in  for each d
then a mean-preserving spread of  would reduce 01(d) at every point, and
hence reduce the optimal lower bound.12 Similarly, if [1   G(d; )]ud(d; )
11Of course, since her discretion is increased, any given agent is also made better o¤ if
the population of agents is perceived to be more reliable.
12See Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970).
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was convex in , then a mean-preserving spread of  would cause the optimal
upper bound to increase. However, without making further assumptions it
is not possible to deduce that increasing the variability of the environment
should cause greater discretion to be given to agents.
3 The Model with Divergent Tastes
In this section we try to provide a foundation for the rather reduced-form
character of the Agents decision making used in the above analysis by mod-
elling the preferences of the Agent in more detail.13
Suppose that both parties have utility functions of the form u(; d; )
where  is a taste parameter which varies from person to person. Suppose,
as before, that the marginal utility of increasing d, ud, is increasing in 
and decreasing in d, but now suppose it is also increasing in . Therefore,
a persons ideal decision, denoted d(; ), is increasing in both  and .
Therefore, the Principal and Agent have similar preferences in the sense that
each will choose a higher d if a higher  is observed, but the Agents response
function will shifted up or down compared to the Principals, depending
on whether the Agents taste parameter is greater than or lower than the
Principals. A straightforward example of a suitable utility function is given
by
u(; ; d) =  1
2
( +   d)2 (10)
in which case
d(; ) = +  :
Let the Principals taste parameter be P and the agents be . The Prin-
cipal does not know  but holds a prior on  described by the distribution
function H(), so that H() is the probability that the Agent has a taste
13Another way of modelling the Agents decision-making process, although from a the-
oretical point of view rather more ad hoc than the one considered in this section, is to
suppose that the Agent is incompetent, rather than having divergent preferences. For in-
stance, suppose that if both parties were omniscient they would each agree that the ideal
policy given the state of the world  is to choose d(). However, because of the possibly
very complex problem involved in reaching a decision, having observed  the Agent, if
unconstrained, would wish to choose the policy d() + , where  is an error term due to
bounded rationality, rather than d(). If the Principal foresees this danger, then in general
it will be in her interest to limit the discretion of this Agent. Moreover, it is straightfor-
ward to obtain from Proposition 4 the result that the more likely  is to be away from
zero (i.e. the more incompetent is the agent), the less discretion she should be given.
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parameter smaller than . The Principal believes that the variables  and 
are independently distributed.14
Given d and , let (d; ) be that value of the taste parameter  for which
the Agent with that taste parameter would wish to make decision d if  is
observed, i.e. d((d; ); )  d. Then (d; ) is increasing in d and decreasing
in . Given , the probability that the Agent would wish to choose a policy
  d is simply the probability that  is no greater than (d; ), in other
words
G(d; ) = H((d; )) (11)
where G is the Agents stochastic response function used in the previous
section.
In order to be able to use Proposition 1 above, we need to understand
when one Agent is more or less reliable than another. So suppose we have
two Agents (or populations of Agents) with distribution functions for their
taste parameter given by H() and H^() respectively. Suppose further that
H^()  H() if   P (12)
H^()  H() if   P
so that the rst Agent is more likely to have a taste parameter close to the
Principals than the other Agent. But if (12) holds, then so does (9). For
suppose that d  d(P ; ). Then by construction (d; )  P and hence
H^()  H() from (12), and hence G^(d; )  G(d; ) from (11). (The other
case where d  d(P ; ) is similar.) Therefore, if the two distributions for 
satisfy (12) then the rst Agent is more reliable than the second.
Therefore, from Proposition 1 above, we may deduce the following result:
Proposition 2 Suppose there are two Agents (or populations of Agents)
whose distribution functions for their taste parameters are H() and H^(),
these satisfying (12). Let the Principals optimal intervals for the two Agents
14It is worth mentioning a technical point concerning the relationship between this
paper and Holmstrom (1984). Holmstrom has an agent with known preferences and with
private information y (which could be multi-dimensional). This paper models the agent
has having private information (; ), and known preferences given this information, but
where the principal cares only about the state of the world . At rst glance, it might be
imagined that the two models were the same provided that (; ) was simply re-labelled as
y. However, Holmstrom relies heavily in his analysis on an assumption that the principal
and agents preferences are coherent, and it is straightforward to show that if the principal
is indi¤erent about one aspect of the agents private information (which the agent does
care about) then preferences cannot possibly be coherent. In this sense, the present model
is a strict generalization of Holmstroms model.
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be [d1; d2] and [d^1; d^2] respectively. Then the Principals expected utility from
delegating to the rst Agent is higher than with the second, and
[d^1; d^2]  [d1; d2]:
4 Applications of the Model
Holmstrom (1984) proposes applications of his model which include a gen-
eralisation of Weitzmans (1974) price-versus-quantity dichotomy and limits
to discretion in insurance contracts. In the following sections I discuss some
further applications.
4.1 Mandatory Sentencing Policy
Consider some given class of crime (murder, for instance). A simple view
of the purpose of a judge in a criminal trial is that he or she is there rstly
to make sure that correct legal procedures take place, and secondly, and in
the event of a guilty verdict, to determine the appropriate punishment given
the particular circumstances of the case. A policy that in recent years has
become more common is that of mandatory sentences for certain crimes.15
This paper provides one rationale for this practice, namely, that judges may
have divergent preferences from the political principal (e.g. Parliament or
Congress).
We could represent the particular circumstances of a case by the parame-
ter , where  could be a measure of the lack of mitigating circumstances
of the particular crime (which varies from case to case). For instance, if a
women kills her drunken and violent husband who has been abusing her for
years, then we might assign a low  to the case. We could imagine, again
over-simplifying somewhat, that a sentence serves two purposes: it is im-
posed as a kind of punishmentfor the crime, and it acts as a deterrent
to potential future o¤enders. (We should also include the incapacitation
and rehabilitationelements, but these are ignored here.) The punishment
element in this decomposition would presumably decrease with the degree of
mitigating circumstances of the particular case.
The agentsin this story are the various judges who might be involved
in the case, and the principalis the public body that is in overall control of
15Or rather, mandatory minimum punishments have become more common; maximum
punishments for given crimes have almost always been stipulated. See, for instance, Robin-
son (1987) for a review of recent US policy in this area and for a discussion of the pros
and cons of judicial discretion over sentencing policy.
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sentencing policy (e.g. Parliament or Congress). Let the preference parame-
ter  represent the weight placed on the punishment relative to the deterrent
element by any particular judge, and let the decision variable d represent the
severity of the sentence. Let u(; d; ) determine the preferences of a judge
with parameter , and let d(; ) denote the ideal punishment of the type-
 judge for a case with circumstances . One representation of preferences
might be to set
u(; d; ) = u1(d) + u2(d; )
where u is decomposed into two parts: u1 concerns the deterrent element
of the punishment (perhaps not dependent on ), and u2 is the punishment
element (which does depend on the lack of mitigating circumstances ). With
this formulation it makes sense to suppose that
u2 > 0 ;
@2u2
@d@
 0
in which case a smaller degree of mitigating circumstances leads all judges
to impose a high punitive element of the sentence. The parameter , then,
represents the punitivenessof a given judge.
Suppose the principal has the preference parameter P . The principal,
if able to write a complete contract for judges specifying the punishment
that should be imposed given the individual circumstances , would instruct
judges to impose the sentence d(P ; ). However, in this context this seems
quite impractical, and since it cannot monitor the circumstances  of each
case it must delegate the punishment decision to individual judges. The
problem is that judgesviews on reasonable sentences may di¤er from those
of the principal, and some will be more lenient and some will be less lenient
than it would wish. In order to counteract the danger of wayward judges,
this paper suggests that the principal should impose mandatory sentencing on
judges, and it should set a minimum sentence d1 and a maximum sentence d2
that any judge could impose for the given class of crime. Moreover, the more
likely it is that judges have preferences that di¤er from those of the principal,
the more restrictive should be these bounds (Proposition 2 above).16 ;17
16One reason why it is that mandatory maximum sentences are much more common
than minimum sentences might be because it generally felt that the greatest danger comes
from some judges being over-zealous in imposing punishments, rather than too timid, and
so Lemma 2 could be relevant.
17An important consideration ignored in this discussion is that if a jury (in a criminal
trial) knows that there is a mandatory minimum sentence that they consider excessive
(e.g. death) they may be unwilling to convict even if they believe the suspect to be guilty.
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4.2 Regulatory Discretion Over Pricing Policy
Consider a regulator deciding on pricing policy in a regulated industry.
Specically, suppose the regulated is setting a price cap for a near-monopoly
and that this rm has an e¢ ciency parameter , where a high  indicates
a less e¢ cient rm. Suppose that this parameter is known by the special-
ist regulatory agency but is not observed by the government. The decision
variable d represents the level of the price cap. A high value of d benets
the near-monopoly as well as any entrants, but hurts consumers. Potential
regulators di¤er in their opinion as to the appropriate weight to place on
prots compared to the interests of consumers. Let  represent this weight
and so
u(; d; ) = v(d) + (d; )
is the social welfare function of the type- regulator, where v(d) is consumer
surplus with the price cap d and (; d) is industry prots with price cap d
and cost parameter . Since a higher  represents a greater weight on rm
prots, we would expect that d(; ), the ideal choice of the type- regulator,
is increasing in  and . This paper, then, suggests that if the government is
unsure of the preferences of its regulator it should limit the discretion of the
regulator by placing minimum and maximum bounds, d1 and d2 respectively,
on the possible regimes the regulator may impose. The less likely it believes
that the regulators preferences will coincide with its own to be, the less
discretion it should choose to give.18
4.3 Discretion Over Monetary Policy
Central bankers often have limits placed on their discretion in several areas.
In particular, they are often strongly encouraged to stay within set bands for
(i) certain measures of the money supply, and (ii) for the countrys exchange
rate as measured against other important currencies. It is probably true
that maintaining policy credibility, in the face of time-inconsistency prob-
lems or of possible speculative attacks, is the dominant reason for such limits
on central bank authority. However, the fact that the central banker may
have preferences over monetary policy which di¤er from those of the govern-
18A real-world example of limited regulatory discretion concerns price cap regulation
as faced by AT&T. This involves a requirement that the rms average price (for a class
of services) does not increase in percentage terms by more than a measure of the rate
of ination less a productivity factor X. The magnitude of X is chosen by the FCC,
the industry regulator. However, the FCC faces limits on its choice of X imposed by
government (these limits being known as stabilizers), and so must choose X to lie within
certain bounds X  X  X.
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ment provides a second rationale for such practices. Consider, for instance,
the tradeo¤ between employment and ination discussed in Kydland and
Prescott (1977). The decision d could represent the tightness of the money
supply (or alternatively, the exchange rate), and this is determined, within
limits, by the central bank. The parameter  could represent the various
monetary and real shocks which a¤ect the terms of the tradeo¤ between em-
ployment and ination, and hence the ideal choice of d. The government
and the central banker have preferences of the form u(; ; d), where  could
represent the conservativenessof the preferences, i.e. a high value of  im-
plies a greater weight being placed on reducing ination at the expense of
employment. A higher , then, implies a higher desired degree of monetary
tightness d (or a greater reluctance to devalue) for any given . If P is the
governments own preference parameter, then Proposition 2 implies that the
more likely the central bankers preference parameter  is to be close to P ,
the more discretion over monetary policy the bank should be given.19
5 Conclusions and Extensions
This paper has presented one way to think about the desirable limits to dis-
cretion when a principal delegates decisions to a well-informed agent with
unknown preferences. If the principal could accurately observe all aspects of
the environment and could write a complete contract specifying the policy
to be taken by the agent in each circumstance, there is no benet in limiting
agency discretion. When this is not possible, however, she must allow the
well-informed agent to decide policy within limits. The advantage of allowing
full discretion is that agents have the freedom to respond to di¤erent environ-
ments in a desirable way. When there is a danger that the agent has policy
preferences that di¤er from those of the principal, full discretion will allow
such an agent the freedom to carry out undesirable policies. The correct
degree of discretion must trade o¤ these two e¤ects. The main result of the
paper (Proposition 2) was that the more likely an agents preferences were
to coincide with the principals, the more discretion over policy the agent
should be given.
The model contained a number of simplifying assumptions that could
perhaps be abandoned in future work. These included the assumptions that
the principal could only use the tool of limiting discretion to a¤ect policy,
that the agents preferences were exogenous and could not be a¤ected by
interest group pressure, and that the decision variable d was a scalar.
19See Delgado and Dumas (1992) for a discussion from a completely di¤erent perspective
of the trade-o¤s between setting narrow and broad bands for exchange rate target zones.
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It would be desirable to analyse the model without the rst assump-
tion. For instance, what would be the e¤ect of introducing choice-contingent
payments to the agent? However, I would regard this analysis as being com-
plementary to that undertaken in this paper, rather than superseding it,
because there are many settings in which choice-contingent payments do not
occur. In addition, and as indicated earlier, I do not believe a full analysis
of this case to be easily tractable. However, there are other mechanisms that
are perhaps more practical which may also improve the situation. For in-
stance, in a repeated principal-agent framework it is natural to suppose that
the principal has the option of sacking the agent if she repeatedly makes
unusual policy choices, and this may act to constrain agents with divergent
preferences. Or it may be possible for the principal to employ more than one
agent (perhaps at a cost) and then to take the averagepolicy recommenda-
tion. Provided that agents tastes  were roughly centered on the principals
parameter  then taking the average would in many cases correspond to re-
ducing the risk of divergent tastes which would then allow the principal to
o¤er greater discretion.20
Secondly, I assumed that the agents tastes were xed. In the case of
regulation, it may well be imagined that regulators are not simply born with
given preferences over consumer versus industry interests, but that interest
groups (e.g. an incumbent rm) can act to inuence the preferences of the
regulator, either by direct bribery or by more subtle inducements such as
promises of lucrative future employment prospects. This has been the focus
of the regulatory capture literature discussed in the Introduction. These
factors are of course likely to play an important role in shaping regulatory
policy in some circumstances, but, in Britain at least, di¤erent regulators
have clearly demonstrated di¤erent approaches to entry, industry prots and
consumer welfare, and it is not plausible that this is due solely to di¤ering
interest group pressures. Rather, it seems likely that di¤erent regulators sim-
ply have di¤erent views, honourably held, on how to run a regulated industry.
This paper presented the opposite polar approach to modelling preferences
to that of the writers on capturein the sense that regulatory preferences
were assumed exogenous. Ideally one would wish to model regulatory be-
havior as a combination of the two approaches. For instance, we could think
of , the relative weight the regulator places on industry prots compared
to consumer welfare, as being composed of two factors: an exogenous taste
parameter  that was uncertain, and the magnitude of industry bribes , so
that  =  + () for some increasing function ().
20This is one argument for using a committee system for deciding monetary policy in
central banks, as is the case, for instance, in the German Bundesbank.
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Finally there is the more technical point about the decision variable d
being a scalar. I do not believe that a generalisation to multi-dimensional
decisions would be straightforward. For one thing, the choice of the set
of possible control sets will be problematic. (In the scalar case, the set
of choice sets that I considered was the set of intervals [d1; d2].) Just as
in the scalar case, the set of all compact sets is too di¢ cult a set to deal
with (I believe), but unlike the scalar case even the set of all convex sets,
for instance, will again be too broad. Instead, in order to gain tractable
results it may be that ad hoc families of sets such as rectangles or circles
would need to be considered, and that because of the articial nature of this
assumption, simple results connecting the dispersion of tastes and the degree
of discretion could be di¢ cult to obtain. Moreover, in a multi-dimensional
setting it will often be precisely the shape of the choice set that is of interest.
For instance, consider the problem of nding the optimal form of price cap
regulation for a multiproduct rm.21 We can think of this problem within
the present framework as one of delegating the decision over pricing policy to
a well-informed agent  the prot-maximising rm  who has preferences
that diverge from social welfare. In this case, what is of interest is the
shape of the allowed set of prices (e.g. to what extent does it resemble such
commonly used mechanisms as average revenue price cap regulation) as
much as anything else.
A Proof of Lemma 1
(i) Fix d > d. Since U() is concave and is maximized at d = d we know
that U 0( d)  0, i.e. Eud( d; )  0. Suppose  is such that d() = d. (If
no such  can be found then d lies outside the range of the Principals ideal
policies, and the following argument can easily be adapted to cope with this
degenerate case.) In particular, since ud is increasing in  and ud( d; ) = 0,
it follows that ud( d; )  0 for    and ud( d; )  0 for   . Then from
(7) we obtain
01( d) =
Z 
min
G( d; )ud( d; )f() d +
Z max

G( d; )ud( d; )f() d

Z 
min
G( d; )ud( d; )f() d +
Z max

G( d; )ud( d; )f() d
= G( d; ) Eud( d; )
 0
21For a discussion of this point, see Armstrong et al. (1994, section 3.3.2).
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where the rst inequality follows from (1).
The proof of (ii) Similar to part (i). 
B Proof of Proposition 1
Let (1(d);2(d)) and (^1(d); ^2(d)) be the two pairs of payo¤ functions for
setting upper and lower bounds for the Principal that result from the two
Agents. Then the following argument is similar to that used in the proof of
Lemma 1. Fix a given d and let  be given by d() = d. Then because u
is concave in d and d() is increasing in , it follows that d  d() if   
and d  d() otherwise, and also that ud( d; )  0 if    and ud( d; )  0
otherwise. Putting these inequalities together and using (7) we obtain
01( d) =
Z 
min
G( d; )ud( d; )f() d +
Z max

G( d; )ud( d; )f() d(13)

Z 
min
G^( d; )ud( d; )f() d +
Z max

G^( d; )ud( d; )f() d
= ^01( d)
where the inequality follows from (9). A similar argument shows that
02(d)  ^02(d) : (14)
Inequality (13) shows that the Principal will necessarily set a higher lower
bound for the less reliable Agent, while (14) shows that she will set a lower
upper bound for the less reliable Agent. In other words, the more reliable
agent will be o¤ered a greater degree of discretion.
It is also intuitive that the Principal will obtain greater expected utility
from a more reliable agent. To see formally that this is true, we can integrate
the third term in (3) by parts to obtain
w(d1; d2; ) = u(d2; ) 
Z d2
d1
ud(; )G(; ) d : (15)
Let w and w^ denote the two payo¤ functions given  resulting from the two
Agents. But it is straightforward to check that if the second Agent is less
reliable than the rst, then w(d1; d2; )  w^(d1; d2; ) for all (d1; d2; ). For
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instance, suppose d1  d()  d2. Then from (15) we obtain
w(d1; d2; ) = u(d2; ) 
Z d()
d1
ud(; )G(; )d  
Z d2
d()
ud(; )G(; )d
 u(d2; ) 
Z d()
d1
ud(; )G^(; )d  
Z d2
d()
ud(; )G^(; )d
= w^(d1; d2; )
where the inequality follows from (9) and the fact that ud(; )  0 if   d()
and ud(; )  0 if   d(). (The case where d() lies outside the interval
[d1; d2] is similar.) Therefore W (d1; d2)  W^ (d1; d2), where W and W^ are
the expected welfare functions resulting from the two Agents. 
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